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 The objective of this study is to investigate whether 
ownership structure and corporate governance affecting the 
efficiency of investment of listed non-financial firms in 
Indonesia. Ownership concentration, managerial 
ownership, management stock option, and mutual funds 
ownership used as independent variables in this study. 
Meanwhile, the dependent variable in the research is 
investment efficiency. Regression analysis is used as a 
method in analyzing secondary data obtained by using 
purposive sampling method. Secondary data used in 
research sourced from the financial statements and annual 
reports of non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange in 2015-2017. The result of this research 
indicates that ownership concentration does not have a 
significant influence towards investment efficiency. This 
result also shows that each of managerial ownership and 
management stock options positively influence investment 
efficiency. Furthermore, mutual funds’ ownership is proven 
that positively influence the investment efficiency 
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BACKGROUND  
Investment efficiency is a 
benchmark in determining how well a 
company invests their assets. The high 
investment efficiency indicates that the 
asset has been used by the company more 
effectively which will have a better effect 
on company performance, so that it can be 
used as a measure of company 
performance (Chen et al., 2017). 
The concentration of ownership, or 
what is commonly called ownership 
concentration, is a situation where there 
are controlling shareholders or majority 
shareholders in a company. Some 
previous studies stated that high 
ownership concentration in a company 
negatively influence the company's 
investment, that means, if the ownership 
concentration gets higher, the investment 
efficiency of corporate will decrease (Chen 
et al., 2017; Rashed et al., 2018) . 
Managerial ownership, on the other hand, 
received differed responses from several 
previous studies relating to its relationship 
with corporate governance. Gao and Kling 
(2008), in their research reveal that 
managerial ownership could reduce the 
existence of tunneling activities that could 
be carried out by management. Rahma 
(2014) found that managerial ownership 
brings a negative effect on the leverage or 
a debt to equity ratio in several Indonesian 
companies. 
Regarding managerial ownership, 
several companies in Indonesia have 
provided stock management options 
compensation and employee stock options 
as an implementation of the incentive 
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policy. This is apparently also done in 
connection with the company's efforts to 
prevent tunneling activities that may be 
carried out by management (Gao and 
Kling, 2008). Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
provide a recommendation regarding this 
matter, that companies could make 
compensation rules to support managers 
in choosing and carrying out actions that 
could increase the value of shareholders, 
even in uncertain conditions and situations 
and rudimentary supervision. In addition, 
several studies suggest that although 
mutual fund ownership is often seen does 
not have a significant role in corporate 
governance mechanisms, it turns out to be 
positively related to company performance 
(Yuan et al., 2008). However, G. Chen et 
al. (2006) argue that mutual funds’ 
ownership cannot support company 
performance if the percentage is low. 
The purpose of this study is to 
investigates the effect of concentration of 
ownership, managerial ownership, 
management stock options and mutual 
fund ownership in influencing investment 
efficiency.This study also use  control 
variables such as controller, operating 
cash flow, leverage, revenue growth, and 
firm size. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
AND HYPOTHESIS 
There are two types of agency 
conflicts that are revealed based on the 
literature: conflict between principal and 
agent or often referred to as principal-
agent conflicts (Meckling, WH and Jensen, 
1976) and conflict among the controlling 
shareholder and minority shareholder 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Agency 
issues that are often discussed are about 
the possibility of misuse of control rights of 
controlling shareholders to achieve 
personal gain. The theory revealed by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) describe 
agency problems among the non-
controlling shareholder (minority 
shareholders) and controlling 
shareholders, where controlling 
shareholders are considered to be capable 
to take economic advantage for 
themselves and strive to always prioritize 
their interests compared the interests of 
non controlling or minority shareholders. 
Agency theory suggests that an agent 
could act in ways that will advance his 
interests, not the interests of the principal, 
unless there are appropriate corporate 
governance mechanisms to prevent such 
actions (Meckling, W. H. and Jensen, 
1976). The agency problem that arises is 
expected to be reduced if the alignment of 
interests between agent and principal is 
carried out, with the mechanism of share 
ownership in the company by 
management. Management is considered 
able to conduct tunneling activities that 
could harm the company, and in turn, harm 
the shareholders. Therefore, managerial 
ownership has a role to reduce agency 
problems between management and 
shareholders.  
 
The Effect of Ownership Concentration 
on Investment Efficiency 
The company’s shareholding 
structure is an important internal 
mechanism of a company. The takeover of 
rights by controlling shareholders has 
become a major issue which is debated on 
the Chinese stock market due to the lack 
of adequate protection from minority 
investors. (Gao and Kling, 2008). The 
takeover behavior by controlling 
shareholders usually involves the misuse 
of company resources thus jeopardizing 
investment efficiency (Jiang et al., 2010). 
A higher concentration of ownership gives 
controlling shareholders with more power 
to be able to take over rights owned by 
minority shareholders, and then in turn 
have the possibility of jeopardizing the 
efficiency of the investment. Thus, the first 
suggested hypothesis is: 
H1. Ownership concentration has a 
negative influence on investment 
efficiency  
The Effect of Managerial Ownership on 
Investment Efficiency 
According to Chen et al. (2009) 
less than two percent of the outstanding 
shares of companies listed at the end of 
2004 in China were represented by 
management, foreign and employees 
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ownership. Previous studies have 
produced mixed findings about the effect 
of governance on managerial ownership. 
Chen (2001) in his research suggest that 
managerial ownership positively influence 
the company performance. Gao and Kling 
(2008) report that tunneling activities by 
controlling shareholders can be mitigated 
by managerial ownership. In contrast, Firth 
et al. (2007) also show that accounting 
quality is not affected by managerial 
ownership. Given that agency costs can be 
reduced by managerial ownership due to 
the separation of ownership and 
supervision or control (Meckling, W. H. and 
Jensen, 1976; Meng et al., 2011), the 
second hypothesis is formulated as 
follows: 
H2. Managerial ownership has a 
positive influence on investment efficiency. 
 
The Effect of Management Stock 
Options on Investment Efficiency 
 
Many Indonesian companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange have a 
management stock option plan (MESOP) 
and an employee stock option plan 
(ESOP) as a form of compensation policy. 
According to research by Conyon and He 
(2012), only 2 to 3 percent of publicly listed 
Chinese companies during 2000 to 2010 
were given limited stock and stock options 
for their CEO’s. It still needs to be 
considered more deeply about whether the 
provision of management stock option as 
a compensation mechanism could align 
the interests between management as a 
party of the company and as a 
shareholder, and also improve company 
performance, such as investment 
efficiency. 
Mehran (1995) and Hanlon et al. 
(2003) (2003) report in their study that 
better company performance in the United 
States is related to providing stock 
management options. According to Ozkan 
(2011) similar effects were also found in 
the UK, while Conyon et al. (2011) in his 
research found that since the late 1980s 
corporate governance in United States 
positively affected by stock options in the 
and had become popular in Europe from 
the mid to the late 1990s. 
H3. Management stock option has 
a positive influence on investment 
efficiency. 
 
The Effect of Mutual Funds’ Ownership 
on Investment Efficiency 
Using data from various companies 
in the United States, Chen et al. (2007) 
illustrate that corporate governance can be 
influenced by mutual funds because of the 
monitoring effects they have. Similar 
results were found in a study developed by 
Aggarwal et al. (2011) in US and non-US 
companies. The result of a study 
developed by Yuan et al. (2008) produces 
a finding that the efficiency of listed 
companies in China can be caused by the 
effective supervisory function of mutual 
funds. 
Since institutional investors in the 
Chinese domestic market (including joint 
investors, insurance companies, trust 
funds and pension funds) were introduced 
in 1997, their net amount and value have 
increased. According to Aggarwal et al. 
(2015) states that mutual funds are a 
greater source of funding and have a 
longer history in the capital market than 
other institutional investors (insurance 
companies, trusts and pension funds) so 
that they can become effective 
governance mechanisms for companies. 
Therefore, we assume that investment 
efficiency positively influenced by mutual 
funds. 
H4. Mutual funds’ ownership has a 
positive influence on investment efficiency. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
This section discussed about the 
measurement of research variables, the 
population, sample selection criteria, and 
data analysis methods used in this study. 
More detailed explanation of the research 
methods used is as written below. 
 
Research Variable 
 
Investment efficiency is the 
dependent variable in this study. In 
accordance with a study that was 
previously examined by Richardson (2006) 
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in forming a measurement of investment 
efficiency, we use an investment model 
that could predict the existence of 
investment efficiency in a company, then 
the residual (error) of the model would be 
used as a proxy to measure the presence 
of inefficiency of investment. 
This study uses the investment 
model with the aim to find out how much 
deviation from the desired investment, 
which is a function of growth opportunities, 
to be used as a proxy for measuring 
investment efficiency. Based on 
Richardson's research (2006), residuals 
that equal to zero explain the average 
unexpected investment expenditure on 
annual observations implied in the 
investment expenditure expectation model 
in all companies. 
Negative deviation from 
investment is expected to be referred to as 
underinvestment, while a positive 
deviation from investment is expected to 
be referred to as overinvestment. The use 
of absolute value of residual to measure 
investment efficiency is based on the 
explanation that inefficient investments are 
low and excessive investments. Therefore, 
the smaller the value of IE, the higher the 
efficiency of investment in a company. The 
model is explained below: 
 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = α + β1Q𝑖,𝑡−1 +  β2CASH𝑖,𝑡−1+ 
β3LEV𝑖,𝑡−1 + β4RET𝑖,𝑡−1 + β5AGE𝑖,𝑡−1+ 
β6SIZE𝑖,𝑡−1 + β7INV𝑖,𝑡−1 + ε𝑖,𝑡 
 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = ( FA𝑖,𝑡−1 +  CIP𝑖,𝑡−1+ IA𝑖,𝑡−1 + LI𝑖,𝑡−1 
) / TA𝑖,𝑡 
 
Definition: 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡  = Investment efficiency 
α  = Constant 
β1Q𝑖,𝑡−1 = Market capitalization 
β2CASH𝑖,𝑡−1 = Net cash flows scaled by 
the book value of total 
assets 
β3LEV𝑖,𝑡−1 = Leverage 
β4RET𝑖,𝑡−1 = Annual market-adjusted 
return 
β5AGE𝑖,𝑡−1 = The difference between 
current year and the IPO 
year of given listed firms 
β6SIZE𝑖,𝑡−1 = Natural logarithm of total 
assets 
β7INV𝑖,𝑡−1 = Investment efficiency in 
prior year 
FA𝑖,𝑡−1  = The sum of fixed assets 
CIP𝑖,𝑡−1  =Construction in progress 
IA𝑖,𝑡−1  = Intangible assets 
LI𝑖,𝑡−1  = Long-term investment 
TA𝑖,𝑡  = Total assets 
ε𝑖,𝑡  = Residual (error) 
 
The shareholding structure of a 
company illustrates how the authority and 
impact that shareholders could give to the 
operational implementation of the 
company are distributed. Concentrated 
ownership and diffused ownership are two 
types of ownership. If most of the 
company's shares are owned by small 
groups or individuals, then the company 
has a concentrated ownership structure. 
To measure the ownership concentration 
in a company, this study uses a total 
percentage of the ten largest 
shareholdings in the company, which 
could be calculated by adding up the 
percentage of the first to tenth largest 
shareholders (Chen et al., 2017). In 
Indonesia, information about the 
percentage of share ownership could be 
seen in the company's Annual Report. 
The existence of managerial 
ownership is assumed to reduce the 
emergence of agency problems, because 
the directors of the company also act as 
shareholders of the company. Therefore, 
the interests between directors and 
shareholders of a company can be 
triggered to be aligned. This study uses the 
percentage of shares owned by the 
company's CEO as managerial 
representative to measure managerial 
ownership. The dummy variable is used to 
represent the subgroup of the sample, the 
value of 1 (one) will be given if the CEO of 
a company has his percentage of company 
shares, and 0 (zero) if not (Chen et al., 
2017). 
Similar to managerial ownership, 
incentives in the form of management 
stock option is considered to minimize the 
risk of agency problems. With the stock 
options owned by management, 
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management as the owner of the 
company's stock options will try to improve 
the company's performance, so that they 
could meet their expectation regarding 
shareholder return. This certainly, at the 
same time, could adjust the interests 
between management and shareholders. 
The third independent variable in this 
study, management stock option, is 
measured using a dummy variable, value 
of 1 (one) will be given if the company uses 
an incentive-based compensation 
mechanism, and 0 (zero) if not. 
With consideration of the previous 
matters, mutual funds are expected to be 
a monitoring tool for company 
performance because it is one of the 
institutional investors that is considered to 
have a longer history and also has a larger 
form than other institutional investors. The 
fourth independent variable, mutual funds’ 
ownership, is measured using a dummy 
variable. A value of 1 (one) will be given if 
mutual funds hold shares in the company, 
and 0 (zero) if not (Chen et al., 2017). 
This study uses five control 
variables, the controller, operating cash 
flow, leverage, revenue growth, and 
company size. Controller is a dummy 
variable illustrated with a value of 1 (one) if 
a foreign or private entity controls the 
company and 0 (zero) if it is the opposite 
(government/state-owned enterprises). 
Operating cash flow is calculated using the 
ratio of operating cash flows to the 
company's total assets. The ratio of debt to 
existing capital owned by the company is 
used to measure the leverage. Revenue 
growth is calculated by comparing the 
income/sales of the company with the 
income/sales of the previous year. 
Company size could show the size of the 
company according to its market 
capitalization. The size of a company could 
be shown by several aspects, including 
total assets. Company measurements are 
carried out in order to distinguish large 
companies from small companies 
quantitatively. This variable is calculated 
using natural logarithms of the total assets 
of the company. 
 
 
 
Sample Determination 
Non-financial firms listed on IDX 
are the population used in this study. The 
sample was chosen using purposive 
sampling method, which is to choose 
sample based on the characteristics 
previously set by researcher. Criteria that 
must be met include: 
1. Consistent non-financial firms listed on 
the IDX in 2015, 2016 and 2017. 
2. The company uses December 31 as 
the end of the year or the closing date 
of books during 2015, 2016 and 2017. 
3. The company discloses data and 
information that is appropriate and 
necessary to support the research. 
This study uses a type of 
secondary data sourced from Bloomberg, 
for data of year 2016 and 2017 obtained 
from the official website of Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX), www.idx.co.id, while for 
data of year 2015 is obtained through the 
official website of each company. 
 
Analysis Method 
Multiple regression analysis is 
used as a method to test each research 
hypothesis. The use of multiple regression 
is to determine the relationship between 
the dependent variable and several 
independent variables. The collected data 
is then processed using SPSS 23. 
𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑀𝑂𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛼3𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑀𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼6𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 
𝛼9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where : 
IE𝑖,𝑡   =Investment Efficiency 
α0   = Constant 
α1TOP𝑖,𝑡  =Ownership concentration 
α2MO𝑖,𝑡  = Managerial ownership 
α3INCTV𝑖,𝑡  =Management stock option 
α4MF𝑖,𝑡   = Mutual funds’ ownership 
α5CTR𝑖,𝑡  = Controller 
α6OCF𝑖,𝑡  = Operating cash flow 
α7LEV𝑖,𝑡  = Leverage 
α8GROWTH𝑖,𝑡  = Revenue growth 
α9SIZE𝑖,𝑡  = Firm size 
ε𝑖,𝑡   = Error 
 
If the ownership concentration, 
managerial ownership, management stock 
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option, mutual funds’ ownership affect 
investment efficiency as predicted, then 
the value of α1 is positive and the value of 
α2, α3, α4 are negative. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Description of Research Sample 
Based on the criteria that must be 
met in the purposive sampling method and 
outliers that are carried out to obtain the 
maximum results, the total sample used is 
46 which could be seen in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Research Object 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Description of Variables 
The following are the results of 
descriptive statistics of the research data. 
Descriptive statistics is performed to obtain 
a general description of each variable, the 
dependent, independent and control 
variables. 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Source: SPSS Output (2018) 
Based on descriptive statistics 
shown in Table 2, the value of investment 
efficiency (IE) as the dependent variable in 
this study has an average value of 0.0826 
and has a standard deviation of 0.06608. 
This data means that the average IE value 
in the sample used is 0.0826. A smaller IE 
value depicts a higher efficiency of a 
company's investment. Conversely, the 
greater the value of IE, the smaller the 
investment efficiency in the company. The 
concentration of ownership is measured by 
percentage of the company's ten largest 
shareholders, and it has an average value 
of 76.1034, and a standard deviation of 
13.09395. It could be interpreted that the 
average of the top ten percentages of 
shares in companies that are sampled in 
this study was 76.1034 percent. The mean 
and standard deviation value of OCF or 
operating cash flow measured by 
calculating the ratio of total operating cash 
flow to total assets is 0.0588 and 0.08707. 
This shows that the sample company has 
an average total operating cash flow of 
total assets of 0.0588. 
The mean of leverage is 1.3952 
which means that the average ratio 
between the total debt of the company to 
the equity of the company being sampled 
is 1.3952 times. The income growth ratio in 
this study sample has a mean value of 
0.0636 and a standard deviation of 
0.33677. The size of the company in this 
study was measured using the natural 
logarithm of total assets, and this variable 
has a mean and standard deviation of 
30,334 and 1,24864. Dummy variables are 
also used in this study, namely those that 
are used to measure managerial 
ownership, management stock option and 
mutual funds’ ownership. In addition, one 
of the control variables in this study, the 
controller, is also measured using a 
dummy variable. The dummy variable in 
this study is not explained in descriptive 
statistical analysis, because it only uses 
the value of 0 and 1 for each sample. 
 
Discussion of Research Results 
The results of hypothesis testing 
are obtained from the t test or partial test. 
This test is conducted to determine 
Description Total 
1. Firms listed on Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (IDX) in 
2017 
2. Financial firms listed on 
Indonesia Stock Exchange 
(IDX) in 2017 
3. Firms that do not provide 
necessary information 
needed for research (2017) 
4. Firms that do not provide 
necessary information 
needed for research (2016) 
5. Firms that do not provide 
necessary information 
needed for research (2015) 
Total firms 
Research sample (3 years) 
Outliers 
586 
 
 
 
(157) 
 
 
(387) 
 
 
(10) 
 
 
(15) 
 
17 
51 
(5) 
Total research sample 46 
 
N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
IE 
TOP 
OCF 
LEV 
GROWTH 
SIZE 
46 
46 
46 
46 
46 
46 
0,0826 
76,103 
0,0588 
1,3952 
0,0636 
30,334 
0,06608 
13,09395 
0,08707 
1,11199 
0,33677 
1,24864 
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whether the dependent variable is 
influenced by individual independent 
variables. If the research variable has sig. 
<0.05, it indicates a significant influence on 
the dependent variable. 
Table 3 shows the coefficient of the 
independent variable ownership 
concentration (IE) has a value of 0,000 and 
the calculated t value of 0.728 with a 
significance level of 0.471. The next 
independent variable, managerial 
ownership (MO) has a coefficient of -0.046 
and t value of -2.117 with a significance of 
0.041. Meanwhile, the independent 
variable management stock option 
(INCTV) has a coefficient of -0.041 and its 
value of t is -2.153, with a significance level 
of 0.038. The last independent variable in 
this study, the mutual funds’ ownership 
(MF) has a coefficient of -0.084 with a level 
of t-count of -2.816 and a significance level 
of 0.008. 
Table 3 
Hypothesis Test 
Source: SPSS Output (2018)  
For control variables, the test 
results shown in Table 3 indicate that the 
controller variable (CTR) has a coefficient 
of -0.006 and t count of -0.234 with a 
significance value of 0.816. The operating 
cash flow control (OCF) variable has a 
coefficient of -0.354 and the value of t 
count is -2.989 and the significance level is 
0.005. The next control variable, leverage 
(LEV) has a coefficient of 0.010 and the 
value of t count is 0.930 and also the 
significance level of 0.358. Next, the 
income growth variable (GROWTH) has a 
coefficient of -0.069 and the value of t 
count is -2.394 with a significance level of 
0.024. The last control variable, firm size 
(SIZE) has a coefficient and t count value 
of 0.033 and 2.867 with a significance level 
of 0.007. 
Variables that significantly 
influence investment efficiency (IE) are 
managerial ownership (MO), management 
stock option (INCTV), mutual funds’ 
ownership (MF), operating cash flow 
(OCF), revenue growth (GROWTH), and 
firm size (SIZE), because the variables 
mentioned above have a smaller 
significance value, or less than 0.05. 
Meanwhile, ownership concentration 
(TOP), controller (CTR) and leverage 
(LEV) have a significance value above 
0.05, from these results it could be 
interpreted that the three variables do not 
significantly influence investment 
efficiency (IE). 
 
Ownership Concentration and 
Investment Efficiency 
The results of the analysis show 
that ownership concentration does not 
significantly influence investment 
efficiency, so the first hypothesis is 
rejected. The results of this test are 
contrary to the research of Chen et al. 
(2017) which states that investment 
efficiency negatively affected by 
ownership concentration. Study 
developed by Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001); Thomsen et al. (2006) also find a 
similar thing, that ownership 
concentration does not have a significant 
effect if it is associated with company 
performance. 
Investment inefficiency can occur 
because controlling shareholders have 
greater rights to control the company and 
the rights of minority shareholders as a 
result of high concentration of ownership. 
However, the test results show that 
ownership concentration in this study does 
not significantly influence investment 
efficiency. This is expected to occur 
because of the ten largest shareholders of 
the firms that are the object of this research 
have an average percentage above 50%. 
This could cause a decrease in the power 
of the accounting numbers information. 
According to Wawo (2013), ownership that 
is concentrated with a percentage level of 
40% and 50% does not have a significant 
effect on the information power of 
Variable B t 
Significance 
(α=0,05) 
(Constant) 
TOP 
MO 
INCTV 
MF 
CTR 
OCF 
LEV 
GROWTH 
SIZE 
-1,011 
0,000 
-0,046 
-0,041 
-0,084 
-0,006 
-0,354 
0,010 
-0,069 
0,033 
-2,704 
0,728 
-2,117 
-2,153 
-2,816 
-0,234 
-2,989 
0,930 
-2,349 
2,867 
0,010 
0,471 
0,041 
0,038 
0,008 
0,816 
0,005 
0,358 
0,024 
0,007 
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accounting numbers, so this is considered 
to be the reason why ownership 
concentration does not have a significant 
effect when it is associated with efficiency 
investation. 
In addition, Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001) in their research state that the 
decision of the parties who own shares in 
the company will be reflected in the 
company's ownership structure. The 
ownership structures, both concentrated 
and scattered, are certainly influenced by 
the interests of shareholders in achieving 
maximum profits. So that this coud lead to 
the absence of a systematic relationship of 
variations in ownership structure with the 
performance of a company, and in this 
case, is investment efficiency. 
 
Managerial Ownership and Investment 
Efficiency 
The influence that managerial 
ownership has on investment efficiency in 
this study is a positive influence. This 
means that when management has a high 
percentage of the company's shares, it can 
improve investment efficiency. 
Management as the party that has the 
authority to manage the company to 
operate properly so that the company 
could achieve maximum profits, in this 
case also plays the role of the company's 
shareholders. The alignment of interests 
between management as a company 
manager and also as an owner could 
minimize the occurrence of agency 
problems, which could be caused by 
differences in priorities between agent and 
principal. 
The alignment of interests can 
occur because managers who are also 
company shareholders have an interest in 
expecting returns that they can get from 
the number of shares they have in the 
company. Thus, a manager who is also a 
shareholder in the company has a mission 
to improve company performance, and this 
ultimately will have an effect on better 
investment efficiency. The statement 
found in the research of Chen et al. (2017) 
which states that managerial ownership in 
a company has a positive effect on 
investment efficiency because it could 
reduce tunneling activities, such as 
earnings management, also supported by 
the results of this study. 
 
Management Stock Options and 
Investment Efficiency 
The third hypothesis of this study is 
that compensation in the form of 
management stock option has a positive 
influence on investment efficiency. Thus, 
giving compensation in the form of stock 
option to management could harmonize 
the interests of two parties, in this case, 
among shareholders and management, in 
return this also could improve company 
performance, including the efficiency of 
company's investment. 
In Indonesia, the company's 
obligation to provide incentive-based 
compensation in the form of stock 
management options is not regulated in 
certain regulations. However, several 
companies have implemented 
compensation by providing MSOP or 
management stock option plan. 
Management is expected to be able to 
make a greater contribution to obtain 
maximum profits that can improve 
company performance through providing 
opportunities for management to own a 
portion of the company's share ownership 
in the form of stock options. 
Similar to managerial ownership, 
providing compensation in the form of 
management stock options can also 
reduce agency problems, because 
management acts as an agent as well as a 
principal, so that the interests between 
managers and shareholders become 
aligned. The results of the study 
successfully demonstrate that 
management stock option compensation 
has a significant influence on investment 
efficiency, and that influence is a positive 
influence. These results support the 
research of Chen et al. (2017) who in his 
research state that executive stock option 
compensation in a company positively 
affect the investment efficiency. 
 
Mutual Funds’ Ownership and 
Investment Efficiency 
The final hypothesis of this study is 
that mutual funds’ ownership positively 
influenced the investment efficiency. 
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Similar to previous two hypotheses, the 
results of the analysis obtained show that 
investment efficiency significantly 
influenced by mutual funds’, and the 
influence it has on investment efficiency is 
a positive influence. Chen et al. (2017) in 
their study reveal that investment 
efficiency positively affected by mutual 
funds’ ownership, because mutual funds 
have a long history in the capital market, 
so that the corporate governance is 
expected to be monitored by mutual funds. 
A long history in the capital market means 
that mutual funds need to maintain a 
reputation and also the trust of clients or a 
group of investors who invest by buying 
investment units from them, which 
certainly want a good return in the future 
as a return on their investment. 
Mutual funds are one of the 
institutional investors that could be called 
as “sophisticated investors”, with that 
being said, mutual funds have more 
opportunities to monitor company 
performance and this could lead to the 
growth of managerial discipline in their 
efforts to always increase the value of the 
company, and this could also mitigate 
management from conducting various 
tunneling activities. Thus, the function of 
mutual funds as part of the ownership 
structure is to act as the owner who 
focuses on the current earnings of a 
company. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Investment efficiency has a close 
relationship with company performance, 
because a good investment efficiency will 
reflect a good company performance, and 
vice versa. If the investment made by the 
company is efficient, the company could 
avoid investment inefficiency, whether it is 
overinvestment or underinvestment. This 
empirical test is conducted to determine 
the effects of ownership concentration, 
managerial ownership, management stock 
option, and mutual funds’ ownership on 
investment efficiency in non-financial firms 
listed on the IDX in 2015, 2016 and 2017. 
Secondary data used in this research is in 
the form of information that could be 
obtained from company’s annual report 
and financial statements which are could 
be obtained in Bloomberg, the official 
website of the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
(IDX) and the company's official website. 
The results of this study prove that 
ownership concentration in a company 
does not significantly influence investment 
efficiency, and that makes the first 
research hypothesis is rejected. In contrast 
to the first hypothesis of this study, 
companies that have managerial 
ownership have proven that positively 
influenced the investment efficiency. The 
analysis’s result proves that compensation 
in the form of management stock option 
granted by the company also positively 
and significantly influences the efficiency 
of the company's investment. This means 
that compensation provided in the form of 
stock management options will increase 
investment efficiency in a company. The 
final hypothesis of this study, mutual funds’ 
ownership positively influences the 
investment efficiency, also prove that it is 
affecting the efficiency positively, so it 
could be interpreted that companies that 
have mutual funds in their shareholder 
structure will have a sturdier investment 
efficiency compared to those who do not 
have mutual funds’ ownership. 
There is five control variables used 
in this study to help finding the influence 
between two variables, independent and 
dependent. The five control variables used 
are controller or controlling party, 
operating cash flow, leverage, revenue 
growth, and firm size. The controller in this 
study prove to have no significant 
relationship on investment efficiency. On 
the other hand, this study shows that 
investment efficiency negatively 
influenced by operating cash flows. From 
the analysis’s result, leverage also prove 
to have no significant influence on 
investment efficiency. While revenue 
growth, and firm size, prove to have a 
significant relationship on investment 
efficiency. 
IMPLICATION AND 
LIMITATION 
This research has the limitations 
faced during the process of analysis and 
interpretation of results. Limitations 
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encountered by researchers during this 
study include, among other things, that this 
study only uses non-financial firms listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) as 
research objects, so that they cannot yet 
represent all types of Indonesian 
companies listed on the IDX. In addition, 
only a few companies disclose the 
percentages of shares owned by ten 
largest shareholders in their annual reports 
in 2015-2017, so the number of samples in 
this study tends to be small. 
Based on these limitations, the 
advice that could be given by researchers 
for future research is that the next study is 
expected to be able to expand on the 
object of research. So, the research will 
not only be limited to non-financial firms, 
but all companies listed on IDX, so that 
both financial and non-financial firms could 
be represented by the research. In 
addition, further research is expected to 
use other proxies to measure the 
ownership concentration, such as by 
calculating the percentage of share 
ownership of the five largest corporate 
shareholders, or other proxies that have 
previously been used to measure 
ownership concentration. Thus, there will 
be more samples that could be analyzed in 
order to test the truth of a hypothesis. 
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